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Abstract 
 
We provide some of the most reliable evidence to date on the direct impact of employee 
involvement through participatory arrangements such as teams on business performance. The data 
we use are extraordinary --daily data for rejection, production and downtime rates for all 
operators in a single plant during a 35 month period, almost 53,000 observations. Our key 
findings are that: (i) membership in offline teams initially enhances individual productivity by 
about 3% and reduces rejection rates by more than 25%; (ii) these improvements are dissipated, 
typically at a rate of 10 to 16% per 100 working days; (iii) the introduction of teams is initially 
accompanied by increased rates of downtime and these costs diminish over time. In addition: (iv) 
the performance-enhancing effects of team membership are greater and more long-lasting for 
team members who are solicited by management to join teams; similar relationships exist for 
more educated team members. These findings, which are best interpreted as lower bound 
estimates of the effects of teams, are consistent with the diverse hypotheses including 
propositions that: (i) employee involvement will produce improved enterprise performance 
through diverse channels including enhanced discretionary effort by employees; (ii) various kinds 
of complementarities accompany many changes in organizational design (such as between teams 
and formal education); (iii) the introduction of high performance workplace practices are best 
viewed as investments, though there are significant learning effects; (iv) differences in 
performance for team members solicited by mangers compared to those who volunteer are 
consistent with various hypotheses including management signaling and opportunistic behavior 
by employees, but inconsistent with hypotheses based on Hawthorne effects. 
   1
I Introduction 
 
  A large number of studies have examined the changing nature of American industrial and 
labor relations during the last thirty years or so. A common theme in much work is the emergence 
of “high performance workplace practices” including various kinds of incentive pay (such as 
profit sharing and employee stock ownership), and mechanisms that provide for employee 
involvement (such as teams, quality circles, total quality management, and information sharing or 
various kinds.) Particular attention has been paid to the use of various kinds of teams. In part 
reflecting differences in what exactly constitutes a team, estimates of the incidence of teams vary.  
However, there is agreement that there has been a dramatic increase in the use of employee 
involvement through mechanisms including teams in US industry.
1     
Paralleling this remarkable change in the nature of the organization of work in America a 
large theoretical literature has arisen that examines diverse matters relating to the pros and cons 
of employee involvement in teams for organizational effectiveness. Much early theoretical 
literature, notably Alchian and Demsetz (1972), was quite pessimistic as to the expected impact 
of participatory arrangements on organizational performance. In this literature special weight was 
given to alleged free-rider and moral-hazard problems in contexts when individual marginal 
products were difficult to ascertain and when sharing of enterprise rewards with non-mangers was 
believed to undermine efforts and effectiveness of central monitors. By contrast much of the 
recent theorizing has been much more optimistic as to the potential for enhanced business 
performance of team based institutions.
2  
                                                 
1 For estimates of the incidence of teams in the U.S., based on establishment-level surveys, see for example 
Osterman (1994), Black and Lynch (2000) and Cappelli and Neumark (2001).  For estimates of the team 
incidence based on firm-level surveys in the U.S., see for example Freeman, Kleiner, and Ostroff (2000).  
For estimates based on worker surveys in the U.S., see for example Freeman and Rogers (1999).   
 
2 See for example Kandel and Lazear (1992) and Milgrom and Roberts (1995).  Gibbons and Waldman 
(1999) provide an insightful survey of the theoretical literature.   
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  Unsurprisingly an empirical literature has begun to emerge that aims to try to resolve 
these theoretical debates. Most first generation studies used firm-level data.
3 However, the use of 
firm-level data meant that, in some instances, empirical work was necessarily limited in its ability 
to provide appropriate tests of hypotheses. For example, the specific channels through which 
participatory arrangements were presumed to affect enterprise performance (including via teams) 
was often unable to be carefully investigated when using firm level data when human resource 
(HR) practices varied across plants within a multi-plant firm. Consequently many recent studies 
have become more disaggregated with the bulk of these second generation studies focusing on 
samples of individual plants or establishments (rather than samples of firms).
4  In addition, to 
investigate related hypotheses including the effect of team composition on business performance 
as well as the impact of important HR events in firms, some recent empirical work by economists 
has begun to investigate individual cases.
5 It is to this latter class of work that this paper makes 
several contributions. 
Specifically, in this study we analyze the economic effects of employee involvement in 
teams in a plant that had only recently introduced offline teams and where not all workers were 
team members. We make use of a unique data set that has been constructed for this case during a 
period of thirty five months. For all operators in that plant as of November 30, 2001 we have 
daily observations for key measures of individual performance, specifically two measures of 
physical production -- individual production records and rejection rates for individual worker 
                                                 
3 Examples that use data for Japanese firms include Kato and Morishima (2002) and Jones and Kato 
(1995). For surveys of mainly firm level studies of the performance of participatory enterprises see, for 
example, Blinder (ed., 1990), Blasi and Kruse (1995), Doucouliagos (1995),  Ben-Ner, Jones and Han 
(1996) and Blair and Kochan (eds., 2000). 
 
4 See for example MacDuffie (1995), Dunlop and Weil (1996), Kelley (1996), Huselid and Becker (1996), 
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Cappelli and Neumark (2001), Black and Lynch (2001), Helper 
(1998), Bartel (2000), and Appelbaum and et. al. (2000).  Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson and Strauss 
(1996) provide a succinct discussion on the key methodological issues encountered by empirical studies.    
 
5 The main case study by economists that focuses on teams is Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2002) while 
Lazear (2000), Kleiner and Helper (2003), Fernie and Metcalf (1999) and Paarch and Shearer (1999) 
employ case studies to investigate the effects of piece rates and performance pay. There is also, of course, a 
wide range of case study work by other social scientists. On teams see, for example, Batt (1999). 
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output. In addition, and again on a daily basis, we have access to data on individual rates of 
downtime. These data enable us to meet the demanding data requirements that are required by 
institutionally informed econometric case studies.  These extraordinary data enable us to provide 
rigorous empirical tests of diverse hypotheses including the direct impact of membership in 
offline teams on production and quality. The structure of the paper is as follows. 
In the next section we briefly provide a conceptual review and develop the hypotheses we 
will test in our empirical work. This is followed by a review of relevant econometric case study 
evidence. To provide adequate institutional context for our statistical analysis, we then provide a 
detailed discussion of key institutional features for our case. In the same section we also discuss 
our data and provide descriptive statistics for key variables used in the empirical work. The main 
parts of our paper are contained in the penultimate section where we present our empirical 
strategy and findings.  
A key finding is that membership in offline teams results in modest but nevertheless 
significant enhanced individual rates of output. More dramatic effects are found for product 
quality as improved quality control leads to large falls in rejection rates. Evidence is also found 
that the introduction of teams is initially accompanied by significant costs in the form of 
increased rates of downtime, though these costs dissipate over time. Consistent with theorists who 
stress the benefits of complementarities in organizational design, we find that the impact of 
enhanced employee involvement through teams alone is not sustained at initial levels. 
Our data also enable us to investigate issues concerning the team member selection 
process and the possible complementary role of education in team effects. When we examine 
team effects separately for those solicited by management and those volunteering to become team 
members without management solicitation, we find that the performance-enhancing effects of 
team membership are greater and more long-lasting for solicited team members. The finding is 
consistent with our conjectures: (i) that management will have a better sense of those individuals 
who will likely be better fits as a team members and also which individuals are more likely to   4
continue to get motivated and to learn skills in teams; (ii) that some of those employees who 
volunteer to become team members without management solicitation may be behaving 
opportunistically; and (iii) that management solicitation serves as a credible signal to the solicited 
workers that they are indeed in the promotion tournament for line supervisors. Turning to 
education, when we study whether the performance effects of team membership differ between 
those with and without education beyond high school, we find that the performance-enhancing 
effects of teams are generally greater and more long-lasting for team members with education 
beyond high school. This evidence suggests a complementarity between teams and formal 
education.  
  
II. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses  
  In this section we briefly review key aspects of the theoretical debate as it relates to the 
expected association between employee involvement and ultimately firm performance. Where 
possible, we review literature that focuses on employee participation specifically via membership 
in teams. Since ours is not a theoretical contribution and good reviews of this literature already 
exist,
6 here we merely provide summary overviews of some of the key elements in the debates.  
Before highlighting some of those themes, however, we make two observations. 
First, we recognize that the theoretical literature sometimes does not clearly recognize 
that, in the real world of work, teams may assume various organizational forms. Some teams are 
on-line (such as “modular production”, “cells” in many US companies) and some are of off-line 
character (such as, in many U.S. firms, cross-functional project teams, task forces, committees 
and problem solving groups or shop floor committees and small group activities in Japan
7)   
Second, in tracing the possible links between individual participation in a “team” and 
ultimately with firm performance, we recognize that this is an extraordinarily complex process. In 
                                                 
6 See for example Gibbons and Waldman (1999). 
 
7  For discussions of various participatory arrangements in Japan see Kato (2000).     5
examining those relationships important theoretical contributions have been made by a range of 
social sciences other than economics, and including social psychology and sociology. Notions of 
intrinsic rewards, organizational commitment and trust must share the stage with assumptions of 
individual and bounded rationality. 
Our central concern is with the impact of employee involvement through offline teams on 
business performance. As already indicated, there is disagreement amongst theorists both as to 
the expected impact of organizational innovations such as teams on individual, group and 
ultimately firm performance as well as concerning the main drivers in these relationships. For 
those who see teams as having largely beneficial effects for firms (and possibly workers), it is 
often argued that teams are required because of other developments, notably the remarkable 
changes in information and communication technologies and the intensification of competition in 
product markets that increasingly are globalized. These changes mean that firms are, amongst 
other things, better able to manage inventory and, in turn, suggests that there will be bigger 
payoff to complementary changes in work organization and quality practices. In particular it is 
expected that there will be benefits to firms to encourage and reward programs that facilitate 
more horizontal co-ordination (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995) among workers and produce 
improved communications among workers so that they can better solve problems.
8 In this view, 
as the extent of horizontal co-ordination grows, this produces a need for structural changes within 
organizations that provide even greater opportunities for enhanced participation, such as teams 
and financial incentive systems that better link enterprise performance with the involvement of 
broader groups of workers than just top managers. 
 While such arrangements are expected to produce several beneficial outcomes we might 
broadly group them into two sets. First is the direct impact of teams resulting from improved 
motivation and enhanced discretionary effort by team members.  For such direct impact, there is 
                                                 
8  Note that this view stands in sharp contrast to arrangements in the traditional vertically organized  firm 
(as modeled by theorists such as Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
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no difference between online and offline teams.  By participating in teams, team members suffer 
less from information asymmetry, and develop more trust in management, stronger commitment 
to the organization and their goals are more aligned with the firm’s.  As a result, improved 
motivation and enhanced discretionary effort result among team members.  Moreover, team 
members learn skills through participating in team activities that may prove to be helpful for their 
regular work.  Improved performance by team members results.  The other set of effects are the 
indirect or spillover effects of teams.  Teams may improve not only team members’ performance 
but also non-team members’ performance.  Such indirect or spillover effects may be more 
relevant to offline teams.  These improvements result mainly from two sources.  First, by solving 
various work problems, teams may contribute to the overall efficiency of the workplace and thus 
both team members and non-team members working in the same workplace end up improving 
their performance.  Second, team members, whose goals are more aligned with firms’ objectives, 
may engage in horizontal or peer monitoring.  As a result, non-team members are less likely to 
shirk and thus their performance also improves.     
Furthermore, we expect improved performance as a result of teams to be felt more 
strongly in product quality than in productivity.
9  Arguably the introduction of participatory 
arrangements in general or offline teams in particular might be expected to change employee 
attitudes so that team members better understand the crucial importance of quality for 
organizational success.
10 Or the introduction of or membership in teams is apt to foster and 
enhance trust which has been identified as a key component of successful business systems (see, 
e.g., Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2003).  In turn this might be expected to lead to discernible 
differences in the quality of the care and attention that team participants devote to their jobs. 
Ultimately these changes might produce improvements in quality control.  
                                                 
9 A similar hypothesis was developed for call center workers by Batt (1999).   
10 Many offline problem-solving teams, such as QC circles are created specifically to solve product quality 
problems.   7
  The principal argument made by those who are more pessimistic as to the impact of 
teams upon firm performance is that the existence of teams may result in free riding by some 
team members (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). While this point is deserving of careful attention in 
many circumstances, arguably the force of the argument is apt to be undermined in situations 
when workers participate in cross-functional off-line teams rather than on-line teams. 
Furthermore, in most business organizations, the economic game is repeated. In such 
circumstances, to the extent that peer monitoring is a potent consideration, there are strong 
incentives for all team members to engage in peer monitoring. 
  Consequently the first hypothesis we examine is whether the introduction of offline teams 
leads to behavioral changes (such as workers becoming more motivated and better informed)  
and, in turn, whether this produces measurable differences in, for example, discretionary effort 
and thus individual production. A second and related hypothesis is whether this organizational 
innovation produces employees who better understand the crucial importance of quality for 
organizational success. In turn does this lead to discernible differences in the quality of the care 
and attention that individuals devote to their jobs, ultimately producing improvements in quality 
control. 
While the bulk of the theoretical literature focuses on issues concerning the impact of 
teams on productivity and product quality, there are other important themes in the literature. Of 
key interest to some is the recognition that the introduction of various forms of participation, even 
if accompanied by overall improvements in organizational effectiveness, may also result in major 
costs to the organization.  In other words, there is a need to consider participation as an 
investment (Levine and Tyson, 1990.) In the case of offline teams, the key costs are the 
opportunity costs incurred when team members attend team meetings during regular hours.
11 It is 
important to investigate hypotheses that bear on the extent and the time profile of these costs. For 
                                                 
11 Though offline teams in Japanese firms (such as the celebrated QC circles) traditionally meet after 
regular hours with only limited or no compensation for team members for attending team meetings, offline 
teams in U.S. firms  normally meet during regular hours.  Thus the opportunity costs of offline teams are 
particularly important for U.S. firms.  See Kato (2000) for offline teams in Japanese firms.       8
example, is it the case that the introduction of teams leads to opportunistic behavior by team 
members (who do not forego compensation when attending meetings)? Does the extent of 
downtime grow over time (as teams become a vehicle for more rent-seeking behavior by team 
members)? Or is it the case that team members do not engage in such opportunistic activities and 
that they become more efficient at conducting and implementing team business over time?  These 
hypotheses relating to the time profile of organizational costs as reflected in downtime constitute 
our third set of hypotheses. Following Levine and Tyson (1990) we hypothesize that the 
introduction of participatory practices must be viewed as an investment by the firm and that this 
organizational innovation is expected to be accompanied by some initial set-up and learning 
costs. But our expectation is that these costs will be dissipated over time if teams function well. 
 The fourth set of hypotheses to be tested concern the time profile of the impact of teams 
on business performance. Some theoretical and empirical literature suggests that an individual 
change in organizational design is expected to be sufficient to produce sustained benefits to the 
firm.
12 By contrast other literature argues that usually what is needed for sustained benefits to the 
firm are complementary measures and that an individual initiative when introduced alone may be 
insufficient to lead to persistent gains. For example, employees might need more sharing of 
enterprise rewards through financial participation, such as profit sharing, gainsharing and 
employee stock ownership to accompany teams lest their commitment to teams becomes 
undermined (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995, Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995 and Kato and Morishima, 
2002).  The QC circle literature often reports that the productivity-enhancing effects of QC circles 
introduced by U.S. firms in 1980s has proved to be short-lived since QCs lacked a 
complementary mechanism to delegate power to front-line workers (e.g., Lawler, 1986, Griffin, 
1988, Levine, 1995).  In addition it is argued that institutional arrangements must also be 
                                                 
12  See for example reviews in Blinder (1990) and in Blair and Kochan (2000). 
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designed so as to provide for good information flows. If only a single change in HR policy is 
introduced, then any gains from innovations such as teams are expected to be short lived. 
An alternative explanation of the short-lived nature of the productivity effect of teams is 
that it is a Hawthorne effect.
13 According to this line of reasoning, team members regard 
themselves as special or they receive individual attention from management. Consequently, better 
performance does not flow from team membership per se, but rather from the special feelings felt 
by team members who are given unusual attention. However, such novelty tends to wear away 
over time and thus the performance improvement is expected to  be short-lived.        
The next hypothesis concerns the relationship between the performance effects of team 
membership and the level of education.  It is plausible that team members with more education 
learn skills more effectively in teams and hence enjoy higher performance gains from team 
membership.  Furthermore, such educated team members may continue to find ways to utilize 
those skills in their daily work.  Simply put, education and teams may be complementary.  The 
potential importance of such complementarity has been suggested in the literature yet there is 
very little systematic evidence on it.
14   
Finally, some employees become team members after solicitation by management while 
some volunteer to become team members without management encouragement.  Consequently 
the performance effects of team membership may be expected to differ between solicited 
members and unsolicited members. Indeed, three hypotheses imply that the performance-
enhancing effects of team membership will be greater and more long-lasting for solicited 
members than for unsolicited members.   One conjecture is that this difference may arise in part 
because, compared to individual employees, skilful personnel managers will have a better sense 
of those individuals who will likely be better fits as team members and also which individuals are 
                                                 
13 See, for instance, Batt (1999) for the Hawthorne effect of teams.   
14 For example, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) find evidence for formal off-the-job training as an 
important ingredient of the high performance work system.  Our study complements their work by testing 
more directly whether improvement in individual worker performance as a result of team membership is 
greater for more highly educated workers.           10
more likely to continue to get motivated and to learn useful skills in teams. Second, it is possible 
that  some employees who volunteer to become team members with no management 
encouragement may be behaving opportunistically—they are simply seeking a paid break from 
their daily production work, provided that they are paid hourly and not by piece rate.  This line of 
reasoning also suggests that the performance-enhancing effects of team membership may be 
smaller for such unsolicited and volunteered team members than for solicited members.  Third, it 
is also possible that management solicitation serves as a credible signal to the solicited workers 
that management considers them in the viable pool of candidates to become line supervisors (or 
in the promotion tournament).  Having been convinced that they are in the promotion tournament, 
they will be motivated to work harder to win the tournament.  Thus the performance-enhancing 
effect of team membership will be greater for solicited members than for unsolicited members.   
Relatedly, the aforementioned Hawthorne effect may be particularly relevant for solicited 
members.  Specifically, it is likely to be solicited team members (rather than volunteers) who 
consider themselves special or who receive particular attention from management.  Thus, the 
existence of a Hawthorne effect would also point to a greater initial improvement in performance 
after the start of team membership for solicited members than for other members.  However, 
since the literature also suggests that the Hawthorne effect should wear away over time, this 
implies that the performance-enhancing effect of team membership for solicited members is 
expected to be particularly short-lived. Hence, if it is a Hawthorne effect that is driving enhanced 
performance by solicited team members, the time profile of the performance improvements is 
predicted to be quite different compared to the pattern that is consistent with the three hypotheses 
discussed previously.   
 
III. Previous Empirical Work 
  As already indicated there is an enormous amount of previous empirical work by 
economists in this broad area and especially as it concerns our first hypothesis on the impact of   11
“participation” upon business performance. However, for the most part the empirical economics 
literature has not used data that provides direct evidence on the impact of participatory practices 
such as teams on the behavior of individual workers and then by extension to the impact on 
organizational and ultimately enterprise performance. Instead, in part because of the difficulties in 
obtaining adequate economic data for individuals, studies have used data at higher levels of 
aggregation—mainly at the level of the firm, though increasingly at the plant level. In these 
studies, if links between, for example, enhanced business performance and “participation” have 
been identified then these have been ascribed to the influence of the existence of a particular 
participatory practice on individual behavior. However, such ascription does involve a leap of 
faith—the available evidence on the posited link between individual behavior and firm 
performance remains largely indirect. 
Similarly, the need to use data at the firm/establishment level has meant that testing of 
hypotheses that relate to the expected timing of the impact of participation or to the effect of 
differences in individual worker characteristics largely have been unable to be undertaken.  In 
addition, the hypothesis-testing literature has tended to focus on the impact of participation on 
measurable economic outcomes such as production and, again largely because of difficulties in 
obtaining high quality data, relatively less attention has been devoted to the impact of 
participation on outcomes such as quality.
15 
  There are, however, a handful of studies that do make important steps in beginning to 
provide direct evidence on hypothesized links between human resource management practices 
such as teams and individual behavior.  A number of pioneering studies (e.g.  Lazear, 2000, 
Helper and Kleiner, 2002, Fernie and Metcalf, 1999, and Paarsh and Shearer, 1999)), focus on the 
effects on individual worker performance of the switch from time rates to piece rates or to 
                                                 
15 An important exceptions are Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) and MacDuffie (1995) who use 
plant-level data on productivity as well as product quality.      12
performance pay.
16 A related line of work examines the effects on individual worker performance 
of the shift to team production (e.g. Batt ,1999 and Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2002). 
The research of Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2002) is probably the closest to our 
study.  They use a new panel data set for a plant in the garment industry to empirically examine 
worker productivity and participation as the plant gradually moved to a team production system.  
They find among other things that the adoption of on-line teams at the plant improved worker 
productivity by 14% on average.  Our study differs from theirs in three important ways.
17  First, 
we examine the impact of offline team membership as opposed to online team membership.  In 
this sense, both studies are complementary.  Second, we use not only a productivity measure but 
also two additional performance measures, namely product rejection rate and downtime.  Third, 
we have additional data on worker characteristics which allow us to test additional hypotheses, 
notably whether the performance effects of team membership are greater for team members with 
more formal schooling and team members who were sought after by management.   
  
III The Case, Data and Descriptive Statistics 
  The case we investigate operates in a depressed region of the country that has shared few 
of the economic gains of the last ten years. It is located in central New York in one of the four 
counties of Oneida, Onondaga, Herkimer and Madison that are close to our home institutions. 
While the population of the average U.S. county grew by 35% during the period 1969-1999, these 
counties have either flat or falling populations, and in the case of Oneida county, population fell 
by more than 15%. These counties are more homogeneous (and white) than is the norm in the 
U.S. despite a decade or so of modest rates of immigration from countries including Bosnia, 
                                                 
16 Unpublished studies include Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) and Helper and Kleiner (2003). 
17 There is, however, an important methodological implication of this difference in the type of teams. Once 
individuals become online team members, individual performance data may no longer be available and 
instead may have to be replaced with aggregate team performance data (as in Hamilton, Nickerson and 
Owan (2002).)  By contrast, in our study, the available performance data do not change before and after 
individuals become offline team members. By continuing to have access to individual daily performance 
data we believe we are using those data that are most pertinent for rigorous hypothesis testing of the impact 
of membership in offline teams.   13
Russia and Viet-Nam. Two of the four counties are more than 96% white, compared to a U.S. 
average of about 75%. While the proportion of high school graduates tends to slightly exceed the 
nation average, the percentage of college graduates typically is below the national average.  
  The postwar period has witnessed continuing capital flight and only limited success in 
maintaining highly paid manufacturing jobs in the region. Partly as a consequence, average wage 
and salary disbursements in the counties (in 1998 dollars) were about the same or lower in 1998 
than in 1969, in contrast to U.S. counties in general in which these disbursements rose over this 
period.  
Our case, hereafter PARTS, is a privately owned, non-unionized subsidiary of a 
multinational firm. At the end of November 2001 PARTS employed 225 employees, including 
132 operators who were directly involved with production.  PARTS is a single-plant firm (as 
opposed to a multi-plant firm), and all 132 operators work in the same plant.  PARTS has grown 
rapidly from 30 workers in 1988 and real sales have tripled since 1995. However the industry is 
very competitive and profit margins are thin. 
PARTS is a light manufacturing firm that makes a range of small components mainly to be 
used by larger manufactures.
18 Typically production items are produced in large runs. While 
products would not be classified as “hi tech” customers demand high quality in the parts that they 
buy and, for example, specify very low tolerances in crucial parts of the components that PARTS 
manufactures. These parts are produced by different machines that require different though 
typically not very high levels of skill to operate. While the nature of the technology sets limits to 
rates of production, the machines permit large discretion in tasks performed by operators so that 
there is much larger scope for variation in the quality of the product produced by different 
operators who use the same machine. 
                                                 
18 Our confidentiality agreement with PARTS prohibit us from identifying the specific product they 
produce.   14
 Hourly workers typically start at $6, though normally within a year they will be earning 
$7.50 an hour.  During the decade preceding our study this firm had never laid off employees 
although occasionally the firm had dispatched workers on a fixed term basis (6 months) to 
neighboring firms. 
Of key interest to us in choosing this case was the fact that, until recently, the HR practices 
at this non-unionized firm were similar to many firms in the U.S. insofar as “high performance 
workplaces practices” were essentially absent. But, as in many U.S. firms, that situation changed 
when teams were introduced. In other words we believe that PARTS may be representative of 
many US firms whose HR practices are undergoing this kind of change. 
Teams were started at PARTS in June 1999 after the introduction of teams by the parent 
firm.  The CEO appears to have taken the introduction of teams seriously, reflecting in part his 
personal interest in employee empowerment. For example, to help to introduce teams to PARTS, 
he hired a full-time consultant with long experience in the introduction of teams at other firms 
(the consultant continues to work for PARTS).  There are two types of teams, A-teams and B-
teams.  A-teams are cross-functional and each A-team consists on average of eight team members 
including one engineer. Importantly for our analysis the way teams were introduced means that 
not all workers were members of A teams.  B-teams are quite different from A teams. B teams 
consist of only managers and supervisors and their main function is to decide whether to approve 
suggestions made by A-teams.  Teams work on specific projects (we will provide some examples 
of team projects below) and typically meet weekly for 30 to 45 minutes during regular hours.  
Participation in teams is in principle voluntary although management sometimes solicits certain 
workers to become team members (we will discuss this in more detail later as well).   There is no 
compensation for team participation, although team participation is evaluated as part of the 
annual performance evaluation process.  
   The centrality of teams in the evolving system of human resource management practices 
at PARTS is perhaps indicated by the relatively limited development of other “high performance   15
workplace practices” at this non-unionized firm. Thus while all-employee meetings are held each 
month (in fact on pay day, the second Thursday of every month), the meetings last only 30 
minutes and there are rarely questions and answers and confidential information is not shared. In 
addition, financial participation by non-managerial employees at this case is quite limited. There 
is, for example, no plan providing for profit sharing or employee ownership. However, during the 
last four years the firm has been contributing $500 each year to each employee’s 401K plan as a 
discretionary bonus. Employees seem to expect to receive this bonus unless the firm has a 
particularly bad year. Neither management nor labor considers it a profit sharing plan.   
In order to help us to gain a detailed knowledge of the nature of production and the realities 
of key dimensions of labor relations at the plant, several types of data were gathered. In this 
process, special attention was paid to the nature and functioning of offline teams. During an 
initial, preparatory stage, lengthy interviews with diverse personnel, notably managerial 
personnel, were conducted. Also a questionnaire was completed by the principal HR manager. 
Finally, worker shadowing exercises were conducted over periods of one to three months. 
These data sources provide much suggestive anecdotal information that, in general, team 
members viewed teams in a positive light. Thus during our worker-shadowing one worker  
attested: " Recommendations made by teams affect our work at least to some extent and plans are 
very likely to be carried out". At the same time we heard claims that while teams may initially 
have had favorable impacts, over time these benefits were believed to have lessened. In other 
words, with the passage of time, in the absence of tangible rewards, the interest of employees in 
being cooperative and their levels of loyalty appear to have fallen.  In addition, the CEO told us 
that he was clearly aware of the falling enthusiasm among team members and that this has 
prompted him to start considering the introduction of a plant-wide gainsharing plan. 
We also observed several examples of projects that offline teams at PARTS had suggested 
and which have been implemented. For example, the shipping area (about 400 square feet) was 
originally quite disorganized and access to the shipping area was cumbersome at best.  A team   16
reorganized this shipping area and thereby created additional free space equaling 175 square feet. 
In turn this allowed workers at all stations to access the shipping area quickly and smoothly.  
Another example is the development of a new labeling system for their spare parts which reduced 
the time required for labeling by half and reduced product defect caused by the use of wrong 
parts.  In addition, a team redesigned the shape of the spare parts container and increased 
efficiency and reduced product defect considerably.  Other examples include developing a better 
fume extraction system at the wire solder station, revising onsite manuals and also devising better 
ways of posting these manuals, and a variety of ways of  rearranging machine locations.      
To provide more systematic information on the potential impact of teams on worker 
attitudes and behaviors (and thus potentially on outcomes for firms), we also undertook an 
unusual face-to-face survey of workers in March 2001. For this survey we received a very high 
response rate (close to 90 percent).  Since findings from that study are discussed in detail 
elsewhere
19, here we simply summarize some of the major findings that emerge from that survey. 
Relative to non-team members, team participants consider themselves to be more empowered, 
sensed that more information was being shared by management, communicated more often with 
managers and supervisors within their work groups or teams, and communicated more often with 
workers outside of their work groups or teams. In addition the survey findings indicate that 
participants in teams put more effort into their work. The evidence is equally suggestive that 
attitudes and thus potentially the behavior of team members was being affected in other ways. 
Thus we find some evidence for participants displaying stronger organizational commitment and 
more trust towards management. In addition we note that team members are more satisfied with 
their jobs, are more positive about the use and contributions of their knowledge and skills and that 
there is no difference between team members and other workers concerning views on job stress. 
  In sum the data based on interviews with HR officials, worker-shadowing, and surveys of 
individual employees together present a reasonably consistent story suggesting that the 
                                                 
19  See Jones, Kato and Weinberg (2003).     17
introduction of and membership in offline teams has been producing behavioral change in team 
members. However, there were also some indications that there were some interesting dynamics 
at work concerning the impact of these developments on individual behaviors. Finally, these data 
provide reasonably strong evidence of change in many of those areas that several theorists have 
long stressed, including trust, commitment and discretionary effort.  
To provide compelling evidence, however, that teams do lead to actual changes in 
measurable outcomes such as production it is necessary to be able to test such hypotheses using 
appropriate and detailed economic data. In this respect we are most fortunate insofar as we have 
been able to collect records for individual workers on various aspects of their daily performance. 
Specifically we were able to collect daily performance data for all 132 operators from January 1, 
1999 through November 30, 2001. These daily performance data are then matched with personnel 
records containing information on worker characteristics, including date of hire and education. 
These records also indicate whether or not individual workers were team members at some point 
during the period of data collection, and if so, whether they were solicited by management to 
become team members or volunteered to join teams. Hence we end up with a very large (almost 
53,000 observations) rich and unusually reliable micro data set.   
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for operators.  The average operator is 39 years old 
with 3.9 years of tenure with PARTS, and his/her wage is quite low ($7,70 an hour).   The bulk of 
operators (62%) are female and 35% have education beyond high school (yet virtually nobody 
has a 4-year college degree).
20  To see if team members differ systematically from non-team 
members in terms of some key worker characteristics, we also report descriptive statistics 
according to team status.  First, from the table we see that 54 operators joined teams during the 
sample period. Reassuringly in most respects the characteristics of team participants and those 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately data on education are missing for 31 workers.   
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who were never in teams are quite similar.
21 The only exception is gender, i.e., team members are 
much more apt to be female.  In short, except for gender, there is no evidence to suggest 
systematic bias in team participation in terms of worker characteristics.    
Data were collected for three key measures of individual performance. The first measure 
is EFFICIENCY which expresses individual production as a percentage of a “norm” that is set for 
each machine (and which remained unchanged during the sample period.) Since most machines 
have an automatic counter that records each workers’ output each working day, these data are 
extraordinarily reliable. The set of EFFICIENCY numbers for a worker during a year is used in 
the annual evaluation of each worker’s performance by his supervisor. 
The second performance measure is the REJECTION RATE. This is a measure of quality 
and records the amount of defective production produced by an individual as a percentage of that 
individual’s production. To compile these data each production worker’s output is tested 
randomly (on average every other working day). Thus the REJECTION RATE is recorded for 
each worker for each audit day. Again these data are most unusual and are apt to be characterized 
by very tiny measurement errors. These sets of rejection rate data, as gathered during a year for 
each individual, are also used as part of the annual evaluation process of each worker’s 
performance by her supervisor.  
The third performance measure is individual DOWNTIME. This measures downtime 
hours for each individual for each working day and includes all time not spent in production. This 
includes time spent setting up a station, time spent waiting for parts, machine repair, greasing, 
various meetings (including team meetings), training, cleaning up time, and time spent on any 
                                                 
21 Note that in many respects the workers in the firm are quite homogeneous. In addition there are no sharp 
differences in race and nationality. In such circumstances we expect that “social connectedness” is apt to be 
high (Glaeser et al., 1999). Consequently we might expect that the potential for the introduction of teams 
fostering trust is especially high in such circumstances.  
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other breaks (including for illness and snacks.) Again these data are collected for each individual 
for each day. 
Data for three measures are shown in Table 2. Average EFFICIENCY, REJECTION 
RATE, DOWNTIME for all workers are, respectively 83.487%, 0.561%, and 0.890 hours per 
day.  To see how these performance measures changed over time, we created Figures 1, 2 and 3.  
The figures also show how the total number of team members increased over time.  First, there 
appear to be considerable monthly fluctuations in all three measures which make it important to 
control for such monthly fluctuations in our regression analysis.
22  Second, both EFFICIENCY 
and REJECTION RATE appear to show some overall improvements as the number of team 
members rise.   
The rest of Table 2 presents average EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, and 
DOWNTIME before and after individual workers become team members.  The data reveal that 
for all team members average EFFICIENCY is higher after joining a team (84.955 vs. 78.643%) 
representing an average 6.312 percentage-point improvement in productivity.  Turning to the data 
on the REJECTION RATE we see that the average REJECTION RATE is considerably lower 
after team membership (0.399 vs. 0.814%). This represents an average 0.415 percentage-point 
improvement in this measure of quality after workers became team members. Finally, when we 
look at DOWNTIME we see that average DOWNTIME is higher after workers joined teams 
(0.969 vs. 0.665) or, on average, 0.304 hours (18 minutes a day) higher.  All differences in 
average EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, and DOWNTIME before and after team 
membership are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
For team members, we undertake similar analyses depending on whether or not team 
members have education beyond high school and whether team membership resulted from 
                                                 
22 Management at PARTS confirmed that this is consistent with their understanding of the nature of 
production at PARTS.   
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management solicitation or not.
23 These findings are reported also in Table 2. For all sub-groups 
of team members we find similar directional changes in all three measures after team 
membership.  All differences in average EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, and DOWNTIME 
before and after team membership are statistically significant at the 1 percent level except for 
EFFICIENCY of team members without education beyond high school.  The size of 
improvements in EFFICIENCY and REJECTION RATE appear to be greater for more educated 
workers than for less educated workers whereas the size of DOWNTIME increase seems to be 
comparable, suggesting a possible complementarity between education and teams.  Solicited team 
members show a substantially greater improvement in the REJECTION RATE than unsolicited 
team members whereas the size of EFFICIENCY gains seem to be somewhat smaller for solicited 
members than for unsolicited members.  Perhaps most interestingly, unsolicited members 
increase their DOWNTIME after team membership considerably more than solicited members, 
suggesting possible opportunistic behavior by unsolicited members.  
Finally, to see if team members are better performers to begin with than non-members, 
we add descriptive statistics for non-team members to Table 2.  There appears to be no such  
“cherry picking.” In fact the data show that non-members have higher EFFICIENCY and lower 
REJECTION RATEs than team members before they joined teams.  In addition, team members 
before they joined teams had lower DOWNTIME than non-members. Thus, there appears to be 
no evidence that team members are prone to have more downtime to begin with than non-
members.          
 
V Empirical Strategy and Findings on Firm Outcomes 
To investigate with more precision the suggestive findings from the previous section, we 
undertake a number of exercises.  Our baseline model, which we use to investigate our core 
                                                 
23 The data on whether or not each team member was solicited by management are provided by the full-
time consultant who has been in charge of all team activities since the introduction of offline teams.  
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hypotheses concerning the impact of teams on productivity and quality, is a simple fixed effects 
model:  
(1) Pit = αMEMBERit + β(DAYS IN TEAM)it +(individual specific fixed effects)  
+ (monthly time dummy variables) + uit 
where Pit is performance of worker i in day t; MEMBERit is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 if worker i is a team member in day t, and the value of zero otherwise.  As previously 
indicated the available data enable us to consider three measures of Pit: (i) EFFICIENCY; (ii) 
REJECTION RATE; and (iii) DOWNTIME.  The estimated coefficients on MEMBERit are used 
to test whether or not team membership affects individual performance.  In addition, we include 
(DAYS IN TEAM)it (the number of days in a team in 100 days) in order to test hypotheses 
concerning whether or not the impact of organizational changes introduced alone can deliver 
sustained benefits in firm performance. That is, in the absence of complementary initiatives, the 
performance effects of team may be expected to change (deteriorate) as that program continues 
without the benefit of other reforms.  
We include individual specific fixed effects to capture the time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity of our workers.  In particular, individual specific fixed effects will attempt to 
control for differences among workers in their innate abilities.  If workers with high innate 
abilities are more likely to join teams, the coefficients on MEMBER might indicate the effects of 
superior innate abilities of workers in general as well as the actual effects of team membership. 
Individual specific fixed effects will help separate the two effects.   
We also include 34 monthly time dummy variables to capture time-specific shocks to 
PARTS that are common to all production workers. (There are actually 35 monthly time dummy 
variables from January 1999 through November 2001.  We use the January 1999 time dummy 
variable as a reference month).   
To see if the estimated coefficients on MEMBERit and (DAYS IN TEAM)it change when 
the tenure of the worker is controlled for, we also considered an additional specification. In this   22
estimate, the tenure of the worker (the number of days for which he/she has been with PARTS) 
and its square are added to Eq. (1).
24,25 
Table 3 summarizes the fixed effect estimates of Eq. (1).  We begin first by discussing 
findings on the impact of team membership on EFFICIENCY (we drop subscripts for exposition 
from now on).  A clear and consistent finding is that there is a positive and significant effect on 
EFFICIENCY of MEMBER thus indicating that team membership leads to improvements in 
productivity.  This effect is apparent in both specifications (with and without controlling for the 
possible tenure effect) and is estimated at plausible levels (e.g. about a 3% gain in 
EFFICIENCY).  In addition, since there is no lag in the impact of team membership we are 
confident in interpreting this as mainly a pure motivation (direct) effect of employee 
involvement.
26  
Furthermore, the negative coefficient on DAYS IN TEAM indicates that the positive 
team effect will diminish as time goes by.  Specifically, the positive team effect on EFFICIENCY 
will fall by about 10% per 100 working days.  As such this provides evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that, in the absence of complementary initiatives, the beneficial effects of measures 
introduced alone (such as teams) can be expected to be short-lived as the motivational effects of 
employee involvement alone are undermined over time.  Note that our evidence is also consistent 
with the Hawthorne effect.  However, later we will provide evidence that the Hawthorne effect 
interpretation may not be particularly relevant to our case.    
                                                 
24 Note that we do not have access to data for individuals who had left the firm during the study period.  
However, we have no reason to believe that these individuals are systematically different than those who 
remain. Based on interviews with HR personnel, those who left include both workers who were below 
average performers as well as those who were well above average and left for better opportunities. Hence 
we have no reason to believe that tenure coefficients will be biased because of selectivity concerns.   
 
25 To avoid multicollinearity between time dummy variables and TENURE, we also tried to restrict the sum 
of all monthly time effects to be zero.  The estimated coefficients on MEMBER and DAYS IN TEAM 
prove to be insensitive to such a restriction.   
 
26  That is, we believe that if the team effect flowed mainly from indirect spillover effects, this would take 
time to show up in the data (and not be manifested as is the case here as soon as team membership begins.) 
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  The effects of team membership on the REJECTION RATE are also reported in the same 
table.  Essentially the results reported parallel those for the previous measure of performance, i.e. 
EFFICIENCY. The key result is a clear and consistent finding of a negative and significant effect 
on the REJECTION RATE of MEMBER, thus indicating that team membership results in an 
improvement in quality. While the average improvement in the REJECTION RATE is a modest 
0.15 percentage point, this represents a 27% improvement in the average REJECTION RATE. 
Furthermore, we observe that the team effect will weaken as DAYS IN TEAM rises, specifically 
diminishing by about 16% in 100 working days after the average worker becomes a team 
member. As such this provides further support for theorists who argue for the need for 
complementary initiatives.  
  Finally we examine the impact of teams on DOWNTIME. Again the evidence is quite 
clear and consistent. In both specifications (with and without controlling for the tenure effects), 
membership in a team is accompanied by a positive and significant effect on DOWNTIME -- 
team membership results in more downtime. Specifically, for the average team member there is a  
0.25 hour (15 minutes) increase in daily DOWNTIME to begin with. This is consistent with 
hypotheses that predict the existence of significant initial costs to investing in participatory 
institutions such as teams.  The major cost in this case is the forgone operation hours of team 
members since team meetings are held during regular working hours.  In addition, the estimated 
coefficients on DAYS IN TEAM are negative and statistically significant, falling by about 6% in 
100 working days after becoming a team member. This indicates that the cost of teams will 
diminish as team members increase their experience with teams and learn how to run their team 
meetings effectively.   
We now turn to additional hypotheses concerning education and management 
solicitation.  To study the team effects separately for team members with and without education 
beyond high school, we modify Eq. (1) as follows: 
(2) Pit = αM(MORE EDUCATED MEMBER)it    24
+ αL(LESS EDUCATED MEMBER)it  
+ βM(MORE EDUCATED MEMBER)it*(DAYS IN TEAM)it  
+ βL(LESS EDUCATED MEMBER)it*(DAYS IN TEAM)it  
+(individual specific fixed effects) + (monthly time dummy variables) + uit 
where (MORE EDUCATED MEMBER)it is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
worker i has education beyond high school and is a team member in day t, and the value of zero 
otherwise; and (LESS EDUCATED MEMBER)it is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 
if worker i does not have education beyond high school and is a team member in day t, and the 
value of zero otherwise.   
Likewise, to study the team effects separately for solicited and unsolicited team members, 
we modify Eq. (1) as follows: 
(3) Pit = αM(SOLICITED MEMBER)it  
+ αL(UNSOLICITED MEMBER)it  
+ βM(SOLICITED MEMBER)it*(DAYS IN TEAM)it  
+ βL(UNSOLICITED MEMBER)it*(DAYS IN TEAM)it  
+(individual specific fixed effects) + (monthly time dummy variables) + uit 
where (SOLICITED MEMBER)it is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if worker i is a 
solicited team member in day t, and the value of zero otherwise; and (UNSOLICITED 
MEMBER)it is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if worker i is an unsolicited team 
member in day t, and the value of zero otherwise.   
  Tables 4 reports the fixed effect estimates of Eq. (2).  For EFFICIENCY, as expected, the 
team effects are greater and more long-lasting for more educated team members than for less 
educated team members.  For the REJECTION RATE, the estimated coefficient on MEMBER is 
statistically significant only for more educated team members.  The estimated coefficient on 
(LESS EDUCATED MEMBER)*(DAYS IN TEAM) is, however, negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that there is no immediate team effect on the REJECTION RATE for less   25
educated team members yet as time goes by, they begin to learn to convert their team experiences 
into their daily performance in quality assurance.  For DOWNTIME, the immediate increase 
appears to be greater for more educated team members than for less educated members.  
Nonetheless, over time, the difference will diminish.  Overall, our findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that there is a complementarity between education and teams.       
  The fixed effect estimates of Eq. (3) are reported in Table 5.  As expected, the team 
effects on EFFICIENCY and the REJECTION RATE are greater for solicited team members than 
for unsolicited members.  In addition, such gains will fall as unsolicited members spend more 
time in teams whereas they will not fall as solicited members spend more time in teams (in fact, 
the positive EFFICIENCY gains from team membership will rise significantly as time passes for 
solicited members).  Concerning DOWNTIME, again as expected, the increase in DOWNTIME 
as a result of team membership is considerably greater for unsolicited members than for solicited 
members.  In addition, such increase in DOWNTIME will fall more slowly for unsolicited 
members as time goes by.  In sum, the evidence is consistent with our conjecture that skilful 
personnel managers will have a better sense of those individuals who will likely be better fits as 
team members and also which individuals are more likely to continue to get motivated and to 
learn useful skills in teams. Our findings also support the hypotheses that some of those 
employees who volunteer to become team members with no management encouragement may be 
behaving opportunistically—they are simply seeking a paid break from their daily production 
work.  Furthermore our findings support the signaling hypothesis that management solicitation 
serves as a credible signal to solicited workers that management considers them in the viable pool 
of candidates to become line supervisors.  Finally, we find no evidence that the performance-
enhancing effect of team membership erodes over time for solicited members whereas we do find 
such evidence for non-solicited members.  As such, these findings are not consistent with the 
Hawthorne effect which predicts that the dissipation of the performance-enhancing effect of 
teams over time will be particularly relevant to solicited members.   26
 
VI Conclusions and Implications 
We use extraordinary data to provide some of the most reliable evidence on diverse 
hypotheses concerning the impact of participatory arrangements such as teams. Our core 
hypotheses relate to the direct impact of offline teams and employee involvement on individual 
(and thus) business performance. Based on daily data for various measures of performance 
including rejection and production rates for all operators in a single plant during a 35 month 
period we find that membership in offline teams results in enhanced enterprise performance. 
While the size of these initial effects depends on the particular specification, gains in efficiency 
average about 3% which is a quite believable number given the relatively limited scope that the 
production process provides for discretionary effort to affect output rates.  In our reading of the 
literature, we find no econometric estimates on the productivity effect of offline teams to which 
our estimates can be compared.  However, Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2002) report a 14- 
percent gain in productivity from the adoption of online teams which is considerably larger than 
our estimated productivity gain.  We believe that one of the main reasons for the relatively small 
productivity gain estimates in our study is that we are capturing only the direct impact on 
motivation and goal alignment (and thus productivity) for team members of the adoption of 
offline teams.  Our estimated productivity gain does not include possible indirect spillover 
effects, such as teams solving various productivity problems (and thus enhancing the overall 
efficiency of the workplace), and team members engaging in peer monitoring (and hence 
enhancing non-members’ productivity).   Consequently our findings may be viewed as lower 
bound estimates of the effects of teams. The gross gains from teams (and which include indirect 
spillover effects) may well be greater than what we have captured by our estimates of the direct 
gains.   
We also find positive and statistically significant impacts of team membership on product 
quality. According to our estimates, rejection rates improve by more than 25%. These findings on   27
output and quality are consistent with hypotheses that predict that the introduction of (and 
membership in) teams will produce more trust by employees in management, improved goal 
alignment between managers and employees and thus enhanced discretionary effort and improved 
attention to quality.  Our evidence is complementary to Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) 
who find a statistically significant positive impact on a physical measure of product quality of 
steel finishing lines of the adoption of the high performance work system which include teams 
among other innovative work practices as well as Rose (1999) who finds a statistically significant 
positive effect on self-reported service quality of online teams for call center workers 
27       
However, we also find clear evidence that the improvements in enterprise outcomes are 
not sustained at their initial levels.
28 Improvements tend to dissipate over time at a rate of 10 to 
16%  per 100 working days.  However this finding is unsurprising to those who stress the need 
for complementarities in HR initiatives. It is, for example, consistent with theorists who predict 
that for sustained improvement in business performance enhanced employee involvement must be 
accompanied by financial participation.   
Moreover, we find yet another evidence of complementarity.  The performance-
enhancing effects of teams are generally greater and more long-lasting for team members with 
education beyond high school, suggesting a complementarity between teams and formal 
education.  
Evidence is also found that the introduction of teams is initially accompanied by 
significant costs in the form of increased rates of downtime. Moreover, these costs diminish over 
time. This finding is consistent with those who predict team learning effects.  As such, the 
introduction of high performance workplace practices are best viewed as investments.   
                                                 
27 As we discussed earlier, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) use plant-level data as opposed to 
individual worker-level data, and Rose (1999) uses a subjective self-reported quality measure instead of an 
objective quality measure.   
28 As such, our evidence is consistent with the QC circle literature that generally reports the transitory 
nature of the benefits of QC circles  (e.g., Lawler, 1986, Griffin, 1988, Levine, 1995).       28
Finally, we find differences in performance for team members solicited by mangers 
compared to those who volunteer which are consistent with various hypotheses including 
management signaling and opportunistic behavior by employees, but inconsistent with 
hypotheses based on Hawthorne effects.   
  One implication of our findings concerns the payoffs to possible set of managerial 
choices that are available to firms today. Some economic theorists argue that firms that operate in 
competitive labor and product markets, especially those subject to global competition have very 
little discretion in setting wage, employment and human resource management practices. 
Consequently, these practices are predicted to be broadly similar across firms in similar 
situations. However, the evidence presented in this paper provides clear and compelling evidence 
that firms can introduce changes (such as teams) and that, as in the case of PARTS, when a 
serious attempt is made to introduce an innovative HR policy such as teams, non-negligible 
benefits to firms are often delivered. This finding is especially important since our case is not a 
hi-tech firm where such choices are perhaps more easy to understand as managers seek to 
motivate highly skilled workers. But PARTS is a firm that uses relatively simple technologies to 
produce components and employs rural low-wage workers with limited education.  Equally, our 
findings indicate that the payoffs to such single innovations may not persist and that the design of 
HR polices in firms needs constant attention. Most likely in order to provide for enduring gains in 
firm performance this will require the introduction of complementary initiatives.  29
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Resources v34, n4 (Fall): 643-67. Table 1 Basic Worker Characteristics of Team Members and Non-team Members as of November 30, 2001
All operators Members Non-members
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
Tenure (years) 3.90 3.73 132 3.52 2.84 54 4.17 4.23 78
Age 39.17 12.10 132 37.29 9.55 54 40.48 13.50 78
hourly wage (dollars) 7.70 1.35 132 7.67 1.27 54 7.72 1.41 78
Proportion male (%) 37.88 132 27.78** 54 44.87 78
Proportion with education beyond high school (%) 34.65 101 40.00 40 31.15 61
Source: Personnel data provided by PARTS
Note: ***the difference between members and non-members statistically significant at the 1% level 
**the difference between members and non-members statistically significant at the 5% level 
*the difference between members and non-members statistically significant at the 10% level Table 2 EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, and DOWNTIME
EFFICIENCY REJECTION RATE DOWNTIME
individual production individual defective production  individual 
as a percentage of norm as a percentage of total production downtime hours
All employees Mean 83.487 0.561 0.890
S.D. 25.756 1.775 1.067
N 52944 30263 52657
All non-team members Mean 84.196 0.502 0.918
S.D. 26.904 1.713 1.065
N 30734 16827 30705
All team members Before Mean 78.643 0.814 0.665
After Mean 84.955 0.399 0.969
Difference 6.312*** -0.415*** 0.304***
More educated members Before Mean 82.706 0.684 0.819
After Mean 86.912 0.358 0.965
Difference 4.206*** -0.326*** 0.146***
Less educated members Before Mean 82.973 0.559 0.867
After Mean 83.181 0.410 0.991
Difference 0.208 -0.149*** 0.124***
Solicited members Before Mean 75.085 1.212 0.605
After Mean 79.357 0.574 0.771
Difference 4.272*** -0.638*** 0.166***
Unsolicited members Before Mean 80.767 0.655 0.673
After Mean 87.305 0.297 1.032
Difference 6.538*** -0.358*** 0.359***
Source: Daily Performance Data of 132 Production Employees of PARTS from January 1 of 1999 to November 30 of 2001  
and Personnel data provided by PARTS  
Notes:
1. More educated members=team members with formal education beyond high school.
2. Less educated members=team members without formal education beyond high school.
3. Solicited members=employees who became team members with management soliciation.
4. Unsolicited members=employees who became team members without management soliciation.
***statistically significant at the 1% level **statistically significant at the 5% level *statistically significant at the 10% levelTable 3 The Effects on EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, DOWNTIME of Team Membership:  
Fixed Effect Estimates for All Members
Dependent Variable
Independent EFFICIENCY REJECTION RATE DOWNTIME
Variable Mean of Mean of Mean of
Independent (1) (2) Independent (3) (4) Independent (5) (6)
Variable Variable Variable
MEMBERit 0.257 2.668*** 2.515*** 0.192 -0.152*** -0.142*** 0.255 0.253*** 0.236***
(6.202) (5.832) (3.160) (2.942) (13.060) (12.181)
DAYS IN TEAMit 0.785 -0.284*** -0.325*** 0.491 0.024*** 0.034** 0.787 -0.016*** -0.020***
(2.631) (2.993) (1.668) (2.287) (3.332) (4.104)
Controlling for the tenure 
of the worker and its square No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 52944 52944 52944 30263 30263 30263 52657 52657 52657
Adjusted R-squared 0.348 0.348 0.106 0.107 0.250 0.252
Source: Daily Performance Data of 132 Production Employees of PARTS from January 1 of 1999 to November 30 of 2001  
and Personnel data provided by PARTS  
Notes:
1. MEMBERit is 1 if Worker i is a team member in Time t, and zero otherwise.  
2. DAYS IN TEAMit = the number of days for which Worker i has been a team member at Time t.  
3. All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.       
***statistically significant at the 1% level **statistically significant at the 5% level *statistically significant at the 10% levelTable 4 The Effects on EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, DOWNTIME of Team Membership: 
Fixed Effect Estimates for Members with and without Education beyond High School
Dependent Variable
Independent EFFICIENCY REJECTION RATE DOWNTIME
Variable Mean of Mean of Mean of
Independent (1) (2) Independent (3) (4) Independent (5) (6)
Variable Variable Variable
MORE EDUCATED MEMBER 0.110 3.941*** 3.374*** 0.059 -0.694*** -0.661*** 0.109 0.211*** 0.162***
(5.164) (4.380) (6.895) (6.518) (6.273) (4.797)
(DAYS IN TEAM)* 0.356 -0.976*** -0.872*** 0.139 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.356 -0.032*** -0.022***
(MORE EDUCATED MEMBER) (5.633) (5.001) 3.622 (3.670) (4.128) (2.905)
LESS EDUCATED MEMBER 0.128 3.098*** 2.856*** 0.110 -0.048 -0.038 0.129 0.146*** 0.126***
(4.474) (4.117) (0.637) (0.503) (4.802) (4.145)
(DAYS IN TEAM)* 0.335 -1.048*** -1.125*** 0.267 -0.054** -0.046* 0.340 0.015* 0.009
(LESS EDUCATED MEMBER) (5.309) (5.687) (2.246) (1.894) 1.762 (1.050)
Controlling for the tenure 
of the worker and its square No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 39351 39351 39351 21965 21965 21965 39340 39340 39340
Adjusted R-squared 0.371 0.371 0.106 0.106 0.252 0.254
Source: Daily Performance Data of 101 Production Employees of PARTS from January 1 of 1999 to November 30 of 2001  
and Personnel data provided by PARTS  
Notes:
1. MORE EDUCATED MEMBERit is 1 if Worker i is a more educated team member in Time t, and zero otherwise. 
(See Table 1 for the definition of more educated members) 
2. LESS EDUCATED MEMBERit is 1 if Worker i is a less educated team member in Time t, and zero otherwise. 
(See Table 1 for the definition of less educated members)  
3. DAYS IN TEAMit = the number of days for which Worker i has been a team member at Time t.  
4. All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.       
***statistically significant at the 1% level **statistically significant at the 5% level *statistically significant at the 10% levelTable 5 The Effects on EFFICIENCY, REJECTION RATE, DOWNTIME of Team Membership:  
Fixed Effect Estimates for Members Sought After by Management and Other Members
Dependent Variable
Independent EFFICIENCY REJECTION RATE DOWNTIME
Variable Mean of Mean of Mean of
Independent (1) (2) Independent (3) (4) Independent (5) (6)
Variable Variable Variable
SOLICITED MEMBER 0.076 2.693*** 2.685*** 0.071 -0.158** -0.155** 0.076 0.177*** 0.177***
(3.741) (3.731) (2.006) (1.962) (5.483) (5.478)
(DAYS IN TEAM)* 0.207 0.832*** 0.754*** 0.174 -0.045* -0.033 0.210 -0.028*** -0.036***
(SOLICITED MEMBER) (4.276) (3.861) (1.819) (1.335) (3.218) (4.153)
UNSOLICITED MEMBER 0.181 2.054*** 1.847*** 0.121 -0.118** -0.105* 0.179 0.305*** 0.281***
(3.947) (3.537) (2.017) (1.790) (12.998) (11.941)
(DAYS IN TEAM)* 0.577 -0.622*** -0.646*** 0.317 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.577 -0.014*** -0.016***
(UNSOLICITED MEMBER) (5.110) (5.302) (3.171) (3.623) (2.569) (2.957)
Controlling for the tenure 
of the worker and its square No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 52944 52944 52944 30263 30263 30263 52657 52657 52657
Adjusted R-squared 0.349 0.349 0.107 0.107 0.250 0.252
Source: Daily Performance Data of 132 Production Employees of PARTS from January 1 of 1999 to November 30 of 2001  
and Personnel data provided by PARTS  
Notes:
1. SOLICITED MEMBERit is 1 if Worker i is a solicited team member in Time t, and zero otherwise. (See Table 1 for the definition of solicited members)
2. UNSOLICITED MEMBERit is 1 if Worker i is a unsolicited team member in Time t, and zero otherwise. (See Table 1 for the definition of solicited members).  
3. DAYS IN TEAMit = the number of days for which Worker i has been a team member at Time t.  
4. All models include individual fixed effects and monthly time dummy variables.  Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses.       
***statistically significant at the 1% level **statistically significant at the 5% level *statistically significant at the 10% levelFigure 1 EFFICIENCY and the Number of Team Members: Jan. 1999-Nov. 2001
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Jan-99
Feb-99
Mar-99
Apr-99
May-99
Jun-99
Jul-99
Aug-99
Sep-99
Oct-99
Nov-99
Dec-99
Jan-00
Feb-00
Mar-00
Apr-00
May-00
Jun-00
Jul-00
Aug-00
Sep-00
Oct-00
Nov-00
Dec-00
Jan-01
Feb-01
Mar-01
Apr-01
May-01
Jun-01
Jul-01
Aug-01
Sep-01
Oct-01
Nov-01
#
 
o
f
 
T
e
a
m
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
s
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
(
M
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
)
# of team members
EFFICIENCY (Monthly Average)Figure 2 REJECTION RATE (Monthly Average) and the Number of Team Members: 
Jan. 1999-Nov. 2001 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Jan-99
Feb-99
Mar-99
Apr-99
May-99
Jun-99
Jul-99
Aug-99
Sep-99
Oct-99
Nov-99
Dec-99
Jan-00
Feb-00
Mar-00
Apr-00
May-00
Jun-00
Jul-00
Aug-00
Sep-00
Oct-00
Nov-00
Dec-00
Jan-01
Feb-01
Mar-01
Apr-01
May-01
Jun-01
Jul-01
Aug-01
Sep-01
Oct-01
Nov-01
#
 
o
f
 
T
e
a
m
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
s
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
R
E
J
E
C
T
I
O
N
 
R
A
T
E
 
(
M
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
)
# of team members
REJECTION RATE (Monthly Average)Figure 3 DOWNTIME (Monthly Average) and the Number of Team Members: 
Jan. 1999-Nov. 2001
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Jan-99
Feb-99
Mar-99
Apr-99
May-99
Jun-99
Jul-99
Aug-99
Sep-99
Oct-99
Nov-99
Dec-99
Jan-00
Feb-00
Mar-00
Apr-00
May-00
Jun-00
Jul-00
Aug-00
Sep-00
Oct-00
Nov-00
Dec-00
Jan-01
Feb-01
Mar-01
Apr-01
May-01
Jun-01
Jul-01
Aug-01
Sep-01
Oct-01
Nov-01
#
 
o
f
 
T
e
a
m
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
s
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
D
O
W
N
T
I
M
E
 
(
M
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
)
# of team members
DOWNTIME (Monthly Average) 
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF 9/15/03 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 612: The Effect of Employee Involvment on Firm Performance: 
Evidence from an Econometric Case Study 
Derek C. Jones and Takao Kato  Sept. 2003 
No. 611: Working Inflow, Outflow, and Churning  Pekka Ilmakunnas and Mika 
Maliranta  
Sept. 2003 
No. 610: Signaling in The Labor Market: New Evidence On Layoffs, 
and Plant Closings 
Nuria Rodriguez-Planas  Sept. 2003 
No. 609: Job Flows and Establishment Characteristics: Variations 
Across U.S. Metropolitan Areas 
R. Jason Faberman  Sept. 2003 
No. 608: Dowry and Intrahousehold Bargaining: Evidence from China  Philip H. Brown  Sept. 2003 
No. 607: Policy Regime Change and Corporate Credit in Bulgaria: 
Asymmetric Supply and Demand Responses 
Rumen Dobrinsky and Nikola 
Markov 
Sept. 2003 
No. 606: Corporate Performance and Market Structure During 
Transition in Hungary 
László Halpern and Gábor Kõrösi  Aug. 2003 
No. 605: Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other 
Norms of Governance 
Amir N. Licht, Chanan 
Goldschmidt, and Shalom H. 
Schwartz 
Aug. 2003 
No. 604: Institutional Subversion: Evidence from Russian Regions  Irina Slinko, Evgeny Yakovlev, 
and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya 
Aug. 2003 
No. 603: The Effects of Privitzation and International Competitive 
Pressure on Firms’ Price-Cost Margins: Micro Evidence from Emerging 
Economics 
Jozef Konings, Patrick Van 
Cayseele and Frederic Warzynski 
Aug. 2003 
No. 602: The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections  Loren Brandt and Matthew 
Turner 
Aug. 2003 
No. 601: Banking Reform In Russia: A Window of Opportunity  Abdur Chowdhury  Aug. 2003 
No. 600: The Impact of Structural Reforms on Employment Growth and 
Labour Productivity: Evidence from Bulgaria and Romania 
Ralitza Dimova  Aug. 2003 
No. 599: Does Product Differentiation Explain The Increase in Exports 
of Transition Countries? 
Yener Kandogan  July 2003 
No. 598: Organizational Culture and Effectiveness: 
Can American Theory Be Applied in Russia? 
Carl F. Fey and Daniel R. 
Denison 
July 2003 
No. 597: Asymmetric Fluctuation Bands in ERM and ERM-II: 
Lessons from the Past and Future Challenges for EU Acceding 
Countries 
Balázs Égert and Rafal 
Kierzenkowski 
July 2003 
No. 596: Mass Privatisation, Corporate Governance and Endogenous 
Ownership Structure 
Irena Grosfeld  July 2003 
No. 595: WTO Accession: What’s in it for Russia?  Abdur Chowdhury  July 2003 
No. 594: The Political-Economy of Argentina’s Debacle  Marcos A. Buscaglia  July 2003 
No. 593: While Labour Hoarding May Be Over, Insiders’ Control Is 
Not.  Determinants of Employment Growth in Polish Large Firms, 
1996-2001 
Kate Bishop and Tomasz 
Mickiewicz 
July 2003 
No. 592: Globalization and Trust: Theory and Evidence from 
Cooperatives 
Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and 
Tarun Khanna 
June 2003 
No. 591: Restructuring or Disintegration of the German Corporate 
Network: Globalization as a Fifth Column 
Bruce Kogut and Gordon Walker  June 2003 
No. 590: Institutional Change and Firm Creation in East-Central 
Europe: An Embedded Politics Approach 
Gerald A. McDermott  June 2003 
No. 589: Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressure and Institutional Change: 
The Case of Foreign Investment and Host Country Governments 
Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. 
Zelner 
June 2003 
No. 588: Institutions and the Vicious Circle of Distrust in the Russian 
Household Deposit Market, 1992-1999 
Andrew Spicer and William Pyle  June 2003 
No. 587: Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in 
Developing Countries: the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Jennifer Tobin and Susan Rose-
Ackerman 
June 2003 
 